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General Description:
Voters, candidates, citizens and election officials want high confidence in the integrity of the 
election process by subjecting electronic vote counts to independent manual audits; and by 
making reports available with which to evaluate rates of voter turnout, voting equipment 
allocation, under-votes, over-votes, spoiled ballots, voting equipment failure, absentee ballots, 
uncounted ballots, and provisional ballots. This bill requires routine independent audits of vote 
count accuracy and requires the release to vote count auditors of records and information 
necessary to verify the integrity of the vote count audits and to evaluate voter service levels.
Amend existing statute to extend the canvass period to 28 days. [Note: The canvass period 
between Election Day and certification of election results should be 28 days to allow ample time for conducting 
vote count audits prior to certifying the election results – 28 days is a common canvass period in some states.]
The board of county canvassers shall meet to canvass the returns no later than 28 days after the 
election.
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Amend existing statute to require that all printed, unused, used, and spoiled ballots shall 
be retained for the 24 month federal preservation period.  [Note: All printed ballots must be 
reconciled or accounted for during the audit to be able to enable  detection of evidence of ballot substitution,  
ballot box stuffing, and ballot tampering.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1.  Definitions.
(a) "Auditable Election" means a regular primary election, regular general election, or the 
presidential primary.  
(b) “Auditable Election Contest” means all election contests for a state or federal office, all 
state-wide ballot propositions; and all state, county, or municipal election contests for the 
position of an election official such as the county clerk’s office.    
(c) “Auditable Vote Count” means a tally of votes for a particular candidate or ballot 
proposition obtained from counting a group of one or more ballots that are counted at one place 
and time. Auditable vote counts can be precinct or polling location vote counts, where each 
vote count is associated with all the paper ballots or voter-verifiable paper records cast within a 
precinct or polling location, or voting machine vote counts, where each vote count is associated 
with the voter-verifiable paper ballot records cast on one voting machine, or batches of ballots 
(counted by hand or by central count optical scan voting systems), where each vote count is 
associated with a batch of ballots maintained as a group. A vote count may be an individual 
ballot only if the voting system produces an auditable report of vote counts for individual 
ballots and preserves ballot privacy.
(d) “Auditable Vote Count Report” means a report of all ballots printed, used, unused, and 
spoiled for each reported auditable vote count for each auditable election contest subject to 
audit for each type of vote (including absentee, early, early and provisional, election day, 
election day and provisional) broken out by type of vote counting system (i.e. central count 
optical scan paper ballots, hand-counted, DRE memory cards, precinct-based optical scan); 
along with the vote counting device and serial number for each device used to tabulate each 
unofficial machine vote count and the precinct and state and federal congressional district 
identifiers for each vote count; plus the approximate number of uncounted ballots and the 
reasons why any ballots are not yet counted.
(e) "Confidence-level" means 100% minus the maximum chance that an incorrect outcome
is certified.  [Note: Certifying an election outcome at 95% confidence-level means that there is 
at most a 5% probability that any incorrect election outcomes that occur would be incorrectly 
certified.]
(f) "Election Audit & Recount Committee" means the independent entity established to help 
develop, approve, and implement a plan to audit & recount vote counts of every auditable 
election and to supervise and direct the vote count audit. 
(g) “Election Outcome” means the specific winners and losers of an auditable election contest.
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(h) “Hand-count” means a counting of the votes, wherein the handling of the voter verifiable 
paper ballot records is done by human hand and the identification of each vote is determined 
by a visual inspection of said records by human beings.
(i) “Machine vote counts” mean vote counts obtained through electronic means whether from 
paper or electronic ballots.
(j) “Mandatory independent routine manual audit” means an independent audit of all auditable 
elections and auditable contests conducted by vote count auditors, following the procedures 
mandated by the Election Audit & Recount Committee, for the purpose of verifying the 
accuracy of election outcomes by randomly selecting unofficial vote counts and comparing 
hand-to-eye counts of voter-verifiable paper ballot records with the unofficial vote counts 
recorded after each auditable election, by each of the following voting systems: touch-screen or 
electronic voting machines, optical scanning equipment, provisional ballots, absentee ballots 
and other ballots mailed to county and state elections officers, whether from a domestic or 
overseas location, and ballots created through the use of a ballot marking device.
(k) “Manual count” or “manual recount” means a hand-to-eye count.
(l) “Random selection or random drawing” means that items are selected by using statistically 
valid probability sampling methods including simple random samples or stratified random 
samples.
(m) “Vote count audit” means a “mandatory independent routine manual audit”.
 (n) "Vote count auditor" means a person selected to conduct a vote count audit who meets the 
criteria set out in the section below titled “Selection of Vote Count Auditors”.
(o) "Vote Count Audit Plan" means the published plan containing the rules, standards, policies, 
procedures, and methods developed by the Election Audit & Recount Committee for 
conducting vote count audits.
(p) “Vote Count Audit Report” shall consist of, for each audited vote count, or precinct, or 
polling location:
1. A comparison of the manual counts obtained during the vote count audit and the 
unofficial vote tabulations reported in the auditable vote count report for each ballot 
type (provisional, early, mail-in, Election Day,…) along with any explanations for the 
discrepancies, and a description of the actions taken by the vote count auditors or 
election officials for resolving the discrepancies, and
2. The number of voters registered to vote, the number of voters who are recorded in 
the poll books and official registry as having signed in to vote, the number of ballots 
cast on each ballot type the number of voters who requested mailed or provisional 
ballots, with the number of ballots cast for each ballot types, and
3. A reconciliation of all voter-verifiable paper ballot records, including all printed 
unused, used, cast, spoiled, counted, and uncounted ballots. I.e. the number of any 
unused, spoiled, cast, counted, and uncounted ballots for each ballot type, and
4. The number of voting machine, memory card, or other electronic failures, and 
7/31/2008 © 2007-2008 Kathy Dopp/National Election Data Archive. A non royalty bearing license to use this 
material is granted, under the conditions: 1) this text is included directly from this document by an elected State or 
Federal Legislator in a bill request, or by an elected County or State Election Official in a procedural requirement; 
or if not, then a one-time non-royalty bearing license to use this material is granted under the conditions that 2) a 
copy of whatever use is made of this material is sent to kathy.dopp@gmail.com and kathy@electionarchive.org 
when it is first disseminated, and 3) full attribution is made to Kathy Dopp/National Election Data Archive along 
with this document’s URL http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-
audits/legislative/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf page 3
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
5. The amount of voting resources and machines allocated, and
6. The number of under-votes, over-votes for each ballot type, and
7. The number of missing or damaged voter-verifiable paper or electronic ballot 
records, and number and type of any damaged or missing paper or electronic 
election records.
8. An evaluation of the ballot reconciliation procedures, ballot security and chain of 
custody procedures used in each county, along with any recommendations for 
remedying any weaknesses found in such procedures.
(q) "Voter-verifiable paper record" means the following auditable records of votes cast:
a. A paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being hand counted or read by 
automatic tabulating equipment;
b. A paper ballot marked by the voter to be mailed to an election officer, whether from 
a domestic or overseas location;
c. A paper ballot created through the use of a ballot marking device if, in each case, the 
record permits the voter to verify that the record is correct before the ballot is cast; or
d. A human-readable paper printout of the voter's vote produced by a touch screen or 
other electronic voting machine, or a voting device if, in each case, the record permits 
the voter to verify that the record is correct before the ballot is cast.
(r) “Voting system” means a collection of one or more voting devices, voting machines, 
automatic tabulating equipment and voting procedures which allow a voter to view ballots, 
select candidates and cast votes, and that aggregates and tabulates all of the votes cast in each 
election.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2. Vote Count Audits -- General Provisions.
(1) For every auditable election, each county shall, in accordance with this statute and using a 
Vote Count Audit Plan approved by the Election Audit & Recount Committee, and under the 
direction and supervision of the Election Audit & Recount Committee or their designees, 
conduct a “vote count audit” of all auditable election contests after initial unofficial election 
results are tabulated and publicly released. 
Procedures for vote count audit shall include:
a) No later than noon on Election Day, each County Election Office shall submit to the 
State Election Audit & Recount Committee and to the State Election Office a list of 
voting machine serial numbers and the State Legislative districts in which each voting 
machine is deployed to record votes, and a list of any voting machine not deployed in 
the election.
b) Auditable Vote Count Reports of Unofficial Results: As soon as possible after polls 
close and prior to the random selection of vote counts to be audited, each county 
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election officer shall submit to the State Election office, and publicly post, an auditable 
vote count report, and shall publicly post the location of the facility for the manual 
audit, along with a list of at least five dates prior to the official canvass date when the 
facility will be available for conducting the vote count audit. 
c) The State Election office shall compile a state-wide auditable vote count report which 
combines all multi-county or state-wide election contests from the individual county 
auditable vote count reports and publicly post its statewide auditable vote count report 
on its web site and submit a copy to the State Election Audit and Recount Committee.
d) After receiving auditable vote count reports from all county election officers, State 
Vote Count Auditors shall as soon as possible, shall determine and publicly publish the 
formulas and methods used to calculate the vote count audit amounts and shall publicly 
publish the audit amounts sufficient to verify each auditable election contest as 
specified in Section (2) and shall provide 24 hours public notice of the time and place 
of the public random selections of vote counts and the times and locations of each 
county’s manual audits.
e) Random Selection of Vote Counts: The State Vote Count Auditors shall in a publicly 
observable and understandable process, randomly select machine vote counts to 
manually audit.  If a spreadsheet or program is used, the public shall be able to observe 
the screen at close range during the process and a copy of the spreadsheet or program 
used shall be made publicly available.  Ten-sided translucent fair dice or other publicly 
observable and understandable method of random selection may be used.  
f) Immediately after randomly selecting vote counts for audit, the State Vote Count 
Auditors shall provide to all county Vote Count Auditors, to all County Election 
Officials, and shall publicly post, a list of all the vote counts identified for manual 
auditing and the vote count audits shall begin immediately or within at most 24 hours 
afterwards.
g) After the random selection of vote counts for audit and before the beginning of the 
manual audit it shall be prohibited for anyone, including election officials, to access or 
to handle any ballot records which have been counted and included in the auditable 
vote count report, except to transport the ballot records, in a publicly observable 
manner, from the location where ballots are stored and secured to the location of the 
manual audit. [Note:  This is necessary because election officials in some states were 
observed going through ballots selected for audit prior to the manual audit, putting the  
integrity of the audit in question.]
h) Reconcile that the number of unused, used, and spoiled ballots equals the number of 
printed ballots and that the number of ballots in each vote count selected for audit is 
equal to the number of voters recorded as having voted in such count.  If necessary to 
reconcile these overall numbers of ballots, additional vote counts may be examined. 
i) Audit Tally Sheet: If more than one auditable election contest is being manually 
counted at the same time, the tally sheet shall be organized in the same order as the 
ballot, with sections for each auditable election contest and question and the name of 
7/31/2008 © 2007-2008 Kathy Dopp/National Election Data Archive. A non royalty bearing license to use this 
material is granted, under the conditions: 1) this text is included directly from this document by an elected State or 
Federal Legislator in a bill request, or by an elected County or State Election Official in a procedural requirement; 
or if not, then a one-time non-royalty bearing license to use this material is granted under the conditions that 2) a 
copy of whatever use is made of this material is sent to kathy.dopp@gmail.com and kathy@electionarchive.org 
when it is first disseminated, and 3) full attribution is made to Kathy Dopp/National Election Data Archive along 
with this document’s URL http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-
audits/legislative/VoteCountAuditBillRequest.pdf page 5
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
each candidate listed in the same order as they are listed on the ballot. There should be 
a space following each name/question for one of the counters to put a hash mark for 
each vote for that candidate/question.  The tally sheet should have a space for the team 
to write in the total votes for each candidate, and the total skipped, defective, cancelled, 
and write-in ballots. A stack and count method may be used instead for counting 
individual paper ballots one auditable election contest at a time.
j) Manual Counts: Voter verifiable paper records selected for audit shall be manually 
counted in a publicly observable way prior to the final canvass.  The public shall be 
able to observe the manual audit at close range during the process.  Auditors shall:
a. Rearrange the audit location for counting. All counting must occur where it is 
visible to members of the public who wish to observe. A video camera may be 
used to magnify the view of the ballot for public observers.
b. Identify all those who will be counting and swear them in.
c. Read the instructions for counting to all the auditors who will be counting.
d. Count the number of registered voters (including any who registered on 
Election Day) who are recorded as having voted.
e. For each vote count selected for manual auditing the election official shall make 
available the corresponding group of sealed paper ballot records or the journal 
tape take-up canister for each DRE paper roll and the Vote Count Auditors 
shall:
i. Examine the tamper evident seal
ii. Note any evidence of tampering on a log provided by the election officer 
for that purpose.
iii. Ascertain the reasons for any evidence of tampering and record the 
reasons on log provide by the election officer for that purpose.
iv. Remove the tamper evident tape seal
f. Each tally team shall have at least two members who look at the paper ballots to 
determine the votes, and at least two members who look at the counts recorded 
by the team to verify their correctness. Unless a sort and stack counting method 
is used for counting individual paper ballots, each counting team shall include, a 
reader who should read off the name of the candidate (the word “yes” or “no” 
for questions) who received the vote on the ballot being counted, at least one 
marker who should make a hash mark beside that name on a tally sheet. If a 
voter has not voted for any candidate for a particular office the reader should 
state “skipped” and the marker should mark the “skipped” row for that office on 
the tally sheet. If the voter voted for two or more candidates for an office where 
the ballot instructs to vote for one the reader should read off “defective” and the 
marker should mark the “defective” row on the tally sheet. If the instructions are 
that a voter should vote for two and the voter voted for three or more, follow 
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these same instructions.  If a voter has cancelled the ballot, the reader should 
state “cancelled” and the marker should mark the “cancelled” row for that office 
on the tally sheet. If the voter wrote in a candidate, that name should be written 
in on the tally sheet.
g. If an observer wishes to protest how the tally team is counting a particular ballot 
he or she needs to do so at the moment in time when that ballot is being counted 
by the team. 
h. Disputed ballots, where voter intention cannot be clearly determined, may be set 
aside and the number of disputed ballots included on the tally sheets
i. As each team completes its totals, the tally sheets should be turned in.
j. If discrepancies are found, the Auditors should investigate and attempt to 
resolve each discrepancy with the County Election Official. 
k. The same vote counts selected for auditing auditable election contests may be 
used to manually audit other election contests that appear on the ballot at the 
discretion of counties.
l. Tally and record the total number of votes hand-counted for each ballot 
proposition and office, as well as the number skipped, defective, or cancelled on 
a log provided by the election officer for that purpose.
k) Audit Logs: A log shall be kept by auditors on a log form provided by the election 
officer for that purpose which shall
i. Record the total number of votes, and skipped, defective, and cancelled 
ballots hand-counted for each auditable election contest.
ii. Note any differences between the hand-counted results and the auditable 
vote count report results. 
iii. Ascertain the reasons for any differences between the hand-counted and 
the auditable vote count report results if possible and record the reasons.
iv. If applicable, note that an audited machine was used both in early voting 
and on Election Day.
If a machine identified for audit failed on Election Day and was replaced by another 
machine, the election officer shall audit both the replacement machine and, to the 
extent possible, the failed machine.
l) Log all the other information required in this section.
m) Each election officer shall make all audit logs available for inspection by the board of 
canvassers and available as a public record; and transmit a summary of the audit logs to 
the State Election Office with the canvassers’ reports and to the State Election Audit 
and Recount Office and preserve a copy with the election returns and voter registration 
records as required by federal statute.
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(2) Amount of Election Audits: Hand-counts of the voter-verifiable paper records 
corresponding to each vote count shall be conducted such that:
(a) the number of auditable vote counts audited shall give at least 95% confidence-
level.  I.e. the probability that at least one miscounted vote count will be in the audit 
sample if the amount of miscounted vote counts were sufficient to reverse an election 
outcome, taking into account the margins between the candidates and the number and 
size of auditable vote counts in the auditable election contest using the number of 
ballots cast to calculate margins and to measure the size of vote counts shall be at least 
95% 1; and 
(b) at least 1% (one per centum) of vote counts in which votes are cast shall be audited; 
and
(c) in addition to the randomly selected auditable vote counts in a) and b) above, if at 
least one auditable vote count has not been selected from each auditable election 
contest in each county in which the auditable election contest occurs then one auditable 
vote count shall be randomly selected for audit from within each county for each 
auditable election contest; and 
(d) in addition to the randomly selected auditable vote counts in a), b), and c) above, 
two discretionary vote counts may be selected for audit by the leading runnerup for any 
state-wide election contest and one discretionary vote count may be selected for audit 
by the leading runner-up for any U.S. House election contest and one discretionary vote 
count may be selected for audit by the leading runnerup for any other auditable election 
contest; [or alternatively, vote counts which calculations show are “suspicious” as 
compared to prior elections or to partisan voter registration or partisan turnout, shall 
also be manually audited].2 
[Note: The intent is to make sure that at least one vote count for each auditable election contest is  
audited in each county.]
(3) Auditor Access to Election Records: Before the audit, each election officer shall take 
whatever measures are necessary to make available to vote count auditors:
a. All written procedures for between-election, pre-election, during election, and 
post-election chain of custody and security procedures for the security of voting 
equipment, and also for the security of paper ballots and paper voter registration 
1 Note: See http://electionmathematics.org Election Audit section for more information.  Election audit efficiency 
can be improved if voting systems are developed which are auditable at the individual machine or ballot levels. 
This is one reason why a Election Audit & Recount Committee should to be permitted to approve alternative 
election audit procedures in the future.
2 Note: Calculation of "suspicious" precincts could assume that at most a 20% vote shift per precinct or batch vote 
count is not suspicious and compare the partisanship of voters to the partisanship of election results in the current 
and prior audited elections as recorded in voter history files to determine vote counts having more than a 20% 
shift, or or another measure could be used for the upper limit of the amount of vote miscount that could occur in 
any one auditable vote count. See Appendix G in http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-
of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf 
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and election records. Specific passwords and security keys shall be redacted, 
and
b. all written procedures provided to poll workers and election judges, and
c. ballot definition files used by voting machines to cast or tally votes, and
d. voter verifiable paper ballot records of vote counts selected for the audit, and
e. poll books and precinct reconciliation records, and
f. electronic and paper voter registration records, and
g. records of absentee ballots and provisional ballots requested by, provided to, 
and mailed back by voters, including those counted and not counted ballots
h. computerized voting equipment log and audit files, and
i. unused, used, and spoiled ballots and electronic ballot records, and
j. ballot definition files and documents, and
k. any summary records of votes or ballots, and
l. any addendum to the original auditable vote count report submitted originally to 
the State Election Office and the State Audit & Recount Committee office 
containing any changes to the number of counted and uncounted ballots and 
votes, with the reasons for the changes documented.
(3) Exceptions to Election Audits for Certain Auditable Election contests: A vote count 
audit shall not be required of a particular auditable election contest under this subtitle if 
 a. the winning candidate in the election had no opposition on the ballot; or 
 b. if a 100% manual recount has been, or will be, conducted of the same auditable election 
contest.
(4) Certification of Election Results: Neither the State Election Office nor any county may 
canvass or certify the results of any auditable election contest which is subject to a vote count 
audit under this subsection prior to the completion of the audits and the announcement and 
publication of the results of the vote count audits in all counties where votes are cast in an 
auditable election contest.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Note: The intent is to audit the state's election results independently of the state election office. The State Auditor  
is an appropriate choice for overseeing a committee that must develop and implement auditing rules and 
regulations that are given the full weight of law and includes processes of chance wherein vote count shall be 
chosen for an audit using probability sampling methods and qualified vote count auditors may be chosen to 
manually examine vote counts using probability sampling methods ]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3. State Election Audit & Recount Committee
(1) The State Auditor’s Office shall: 
(a) within thirty (30) days of the date this statute is signed into law, notify appropriate 
organizations to appoint members for and accept appointments for members of the 
State Election Audit & Recount Committee (E.A.R.C.). The E.A.R.C. shall consist of at 
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least seventeen (17) members who may serve a maximum of (2) two (4) four-year 
terms in any (10) ten-year period, none of whom shall be or were:
(i)  a member of the State's Voting Equipment Selection Committee or State 
Help America Vote Act Plan Committee on Election Reform; or
(ii)  an owner, employee or sub-contractor of a voting system company,  or 
voting system service company, or voting system supply company; or
(iii) working for any political candidate’s campaign or ballot proposition.
(b) ensure that the E.A.R.C. committee includes 17 to 23 members (13 to 19 of whom 
are voting members) including:
(i) three to four members who shall have at least a Master’s Degree in 
mathematics or statistics and be appointed by the chair persons of the four 
largest university and college mathematics or statistics departments in the 
State, all of whom shall be invited to appoint someone to serve on the 
committee; and
(ii) two to three members who shall have at least a Master’s Degree in 
computer science or computer engineering or computer security; appointed 
by the chair persons of the three largest university or college computer science 
departments in the State, all of whom shall be invited to appoint someone to 
serve on the committee; and
(iii)  two to three members appointed by chair persons of the three largest 
university or college government political science departments in the State, all 
of whom shall be invited to appoint someone to serve on the committee, and
(iv) two members who are financial auditors appointed by the State’s Chief 
Auditor,  
(v) two to three political party members appointed by the chair persons of the 
three State political parties which garnered the most votes in the State in the last 
federal election, all of whom shall be invited to appoint someone to serve on the 
committee,
 (vi) two to four members who are appointed by the trustees of grassroots 
nonprofit election rights or open government organizations in the State and 
who have served in a prior election as an election judge or poll worker,
(vii) at least four non-voting members who are county election officers, 
appointed by the association of county election officials; 
(viii) one non-voting member appointed by the State Election Office; and
(ix) an attorney with expertise in election law appointed by the State Attorney 
General's Office to serve as a non-voting member of the committee to give 
advice on the legality of the operations of and any rules and regulations 
proposed by the E.A.R.C.
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(c) ensure that the organizations which are qualified to appoint State E.A.R.C. members 
are notified and E.A.R.C. members are appointed at least forty-five (45) days prior to 
the second Monday in January in each auditable election year, and arrange for space, 
teleconference and other facilities for E.A.R.C. meetings and to meet E.A.R.C. 
requirements; and publicly publish any reports submitted by the E.A.R.C.
[Notes: Although input from county and state election offices is necessary for coordination (and 
therefore county elections officers are included as members) voting system insiders should be 
kept to a minimum in order to reduce the possibility of a conflict of interest. The size of  
university and college departments shall be determined by the number of total students, staff, & 
faculty currently in the department.]
(2) Compensation for the E.A.R.C.
(a) A member of the committee who is not a government employee may receive 
$50/hour up to $5,000 compensation per each auditable election year for compensation 
and benefits for the member's services, and may also receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by 
the appropriate State statute or agency. This amount may be adjusted annually for 
inflation by whatever method the state uses to adjust for inflation.
(b) A member may decline to receive compensation or per diem and expenses for the 
member's services.
(c) A state government officer or employee member who does not receive salary, per 
diem, or expenses from the member's agency for the member's service may receive per 
diem and expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the 
rates established by the appropriate State statute or agency.
(d) A state government officer or employee member may decline to receive per diem 
for the member's service. 
 [Note: There may be significant work required of some members, especially in the first auditable 
election cycle after this legislation is passed.]
(3) The State Auditor shall fill any vacancies that occur on the committee between terms, 
following the guidelines herein.
(4) The State Auditor's offices shall provide staffing for the committee.
(5) Terms of Office: The members of the E.A.R.C. shall have four year terms with half of its 
initial members having at most one four year term during the first five years.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 4.  Election Audit & Recount Committee (E.A.R.C.) Responsibilities
(1) The E.A.R.C. shall meet at least ten times during auditable election years. [Note: Meetings 
may be via teleconference.]
(2) The E.A.R.C. shall develop, evaluate, and update a Vote Count Audit & Recount Plan 
(VCAR Plan) that includes:
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(a) a uniform format for reporting unofficial election data for the auditable vote count 
report of unofficial vote counts; [Note: Standard XML/OASIS EML (Election Markup 
Language) is recommended and is currently being used by California and is loved by press.]
(b) a method or methods for determining vote count audit sample sizes that meets the 
requirement for 95% confidence-level audits; 
(c) a method or methods for making random selections of vote counts to audit selection 
that may be proportional to the amount of margin error it could contain, and each vote 
count has a nonzero chance for selection and each selection round selects at least one 
auditable vote count;
(d) a method for deciding when to expand audit samples and when to certify election 
results that meets the requirement for 95% confidence-level audits;
(e) rules, standards, policies, procedures and processes for conducting vote count audits 
within the State;
(f) a method or methods to appoint a chief independent auditor to oversee each county’s 
election audits;
(g) a method or methods to select and assign vote count auditors to count specific vote 
counts;
(h) a uniform format for auditing forms and for vote count audit reports, and
(i) methods for analyzing audit discrepancy results in order to decide whether or not to 
certify the election or to expand the audit.
(2) The E.A.R.C. shall publish the VCAR Plan and provide for a period of public review and 
comment on it before approving, publishing and implementing the VCAR Plan for each 
auditable election.
(3) The E.A.R.C. is authorized to coordinate with the State Elections Office, State Auditor's 
Office and with county election officers in auditing the vote count.
(4) The E.A.R.C. shall publicly publish a report evaluating the efficacy and efficiency of 
election audits and advise the State Election Office and the State Legislature of any problems 
or recommendations to reduce vote count errors or improve voting and election systems in 
future elections.    
(5) The E.A.R.C. shall advise the State Election Office and County Election Officials’ 
Association by evaluating the auditability of new voting systems considered for purchase 
within the State.
(6) The E.A.R.C. shall advise the State Election Office on request for proposals (RFP) and on 
the awarding of contracts for voting and election system studies or for purchasing voting and 
election system equipment. 
(7) The E.A.R.C. shall be subject to State open records and meetings laws. 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 5. Random Selection of Vote Counts to Audit
The Election Audit and Recount Committee (E.A.R.C.) shall determine and publicly announce 
the method of conducting the random drawings or random selections, at least 30 days before 
the election. The random drawings or selections shall occur after the polls close and after each 
county has publicly posted an auditable vote count report of its unofficial vote counts. Vote 
counts audited under this subdivision shall be selected according to standards and procedures 
required by this statute and developed by the E.A.R.C. that are announced in advance to the 
public and the drawings shall be open to the public. The random selection of vote counts for 
the mandatory vote count audit shall be made by a publicly transparent method by the 
E.A.R.C. or its designees. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 6. Selection of Vote Count Auditors
The county election official shall determine the procedure for selecting the vote count auditors, 
subject to any requirements made by the E.A.R.C.  Vote count auditors shall not include any:
(a) employee or official of any county election official’s office or anyone who 
administered the auditable election,
(b) employee or elected official from the State Election office,
(c) employee or officer of any entity that designs, manufactures, or services a voting 
system or supplier of any voting system used in the State,
(d) person who maintains or has special access to the voting system that a voter would 
not normally have, prior to, or during the auditable election,
(e) person who acted as a poll worker or an election judge during the same auditable 
election, or 
(f) person serving in any position on any political campaign committee of any 
candidate for political office or working for groups supporting propositions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 7. Public Notice, Access & Disclosure
1. An auditable vote count report shall be made publicly available for each county and by 
the State Election office for the entire state, as soon as possible after polls close and 
before random selection of machine vote counts to audit.
2. The date, time and location of the random selections of vote counts to be audited and 
the dates, times, and places of the manual vote count audits shall be noticed at least one 
day (twenty-four hours) before the random selection is conducted.   
3. The amount of the manual audits shall be noticed prior to the random selections. The 
notice should include information on the number of recount teams that will be used so 
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that the candidates have the opportunity to bring an appropriate number of 
representatives to watch each recount team.  
4. As soon as practicable after the completion of a vote count audit and analysis 
conducted under this subsection, the vote count auditors shall announce and publish the 
vote count audit report.  The vote count audit report shall be prepared by the vote count 
auditors, signed and forthwith filed with the elections officer, the state Vote Count 
Audit Office, the State Auditor’s Office, and the State Election Office and shall be 
made publicly available on the Internet. The reconciliation sheets shall be open to 
public inspection and may be used as prima facie evidence of a discrepancy in any 
contest arising pursuant to the election statutes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 8. Audit All Vote Types
The voter-verifiable paper records of votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or 
before the date of the auditable election, other than provisional ballots, shall be hand counted 
by vote count auditors and those recorded manual counts compared with the auditable vote 
count report for those auditable vote counts released prior to their random selection for 
auditing. The voter-verifiable paper records of votes cast other than at the precinct or 
equivalent location on or before the date of the auditable election, including votes cast by 
absentee voters, absent uniformed services voters, and overseas voters, and votes cast by 
provisional ballot, shall be hand counted by the vote count auditors and those recorded counts 
compared with an auditable vote count report of those ballots that is released prior to their 
random selection for auditing. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 9. Additional Audits If Cause Shown 
If the auditors are unable to reconcile the manual count with the electronic vote tabulation, then 
the E.A.R.C. with the assistance of County Election Officials and the State Election Official 
shall initiate or conduct such further investigation of the discrepancies as may be necessary for 
the purpose of reviewing whether or not to certify the election results, or expand the vote count 
audit, and may order a re-canvass in accordance with the provisions of the election code. 
If any voter-verifiable, paper record is found to have been damaged or missing, then the 
damaged or missing records shall be assumed to be discrepant with the machine counts 
reported in the unofficial auditable vote count report, and a tabulation of such damaged and 
missing paper records will be duly recorded, and an explanation sought. In the event of any 
inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic records and the voter-verifiable paper 
records, the paper records shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast, except in the 
case where evidence exists that indicates that the paper record has been tampered with or 
damaged, in which case, if an outcome is in question, a court will decide. 
Additional audits desired due to evidence uncovered during an audit of machine malfunction or 
errors which are judged to exist in insufficient amounts to produce incorrect election outcomes 
may be performed after the certification of the election results. 
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If vote count auditors find sufficient discrepancies, due to any cause, between the unofficial 
tallies and the manual audit tallies, then the E.A.R.C. shall randomly select and administer 
manual counts of additional vote counts as considered appropriate to resolve any concerns 
resulting from the audit until the election outcomes can be certified with at least a 95% 
confidence-level.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 10. Time Table for Audit Process
1. By noon on Election Day, all election officers shall provide a list of all voting and election 
machinery and their corresponding serial numbers, and any corresponding precinct 
identifiers, and corresponding congressional districts that machinery will be used for.
3. As soon as possible after polls close on Election Day, all County Election Officials shall 
submit an auditable vote count report of detailed vote counts for each machine and precinct 
in each election contest for each vote type to the State Election Office, to the State Vote 
Count Auditor, and publicly post it.
4. Within 36 hours of receiving auditable vote count reports of vote counts from each county, 
the State Election Office shall publicly release an auditable vote count report for multi-
county election contests and election contests submitted to voters in the state and provide a 
copy to the State Election Audit and Recount members and post a copy publicly.
5. Within 36 hours of  receiving the auditable vote count reports of vote counts, the E.A.R.C. 
shall determine and then announce how many vote counts in the State must be audited for 
each auditable election contest and publicly post this information and inform county election 
officials and vote count auditors, and the E.A.R.C. and the State Election Office shall at the 
same time publish a public notice, including in a prominent place on the State Elections 
Office website, giving at least 24 hours (1 day) advance notice of the date, time and place, 
including street address, building and room number, of the public random drawings of vote 
counts, and the dates, times and places, including street address, building and room number 
of the public manual vote counts audits.
6. The E.A.R.C. or its designees shall conduct public random drawings to determine which 
vote counts in each county will be independently manually audited.
7. Immediately following the random drawing, election officers and auditors shall begin the 
publicly observable vote count audit of all voter-verifiable paper ballot records associated 
with the vote counts selected for auditing.  Election officers and auditors shall conduct the 
initial manual audit with sufficient auditors to complete the hand counts and other 
verifications within 96 hours (4 days) of when audits are initiated.
10.  As soon as practicable after the completion of a vote count audit conducted under this 
statute, the county shall announce and publish the audit report.
11.  Deadline for completion of audits: The counties shall complete the vote count audits and 
announce and submit the results to the E.A.R.C. and the State Election Office for publication 
of the information required under this section in time for the State Election Office to certify 
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the results of the election and provide for the final determination of any controversy prior to 
the deadline described in section 6 of the title 3, United States Code.
Section 11: County Election Official – Responsibilities for Vote Count Audits
County Election Officials or their official representatives shall:
(1) Remove any opaque plastic covers or any obstructions which obscure voters’ view of 
sealed voter-verifiable machine-printed paper roll ballot records, and 
(2) Include, in all instructions for voters on how to vote, instructions telling voters to 
review and verify the accuracy of any machine-printed voter-verifiable paper ballots, 
and
(3) Plan and implement voting system procedures which, in all cases, allow a voter to 
review and approve a human-readable paper record of the voter’s ballot whenever an 
electronic ballot record is cast [Note: This is necessary to overcome the “three strikes you’re  
out” DRE paper roll programming that casts a ballot that was not approved by the voter after 
two unsuccessful tries by the voter to create a matching paper ballot roll record; and to  
overcome the problem of DRE printers that malfunction during voting.], and
(4) At least one month prior to Election Day in any election covered by this audit 
legislation, publicly post and provide to the State Election Audit and Recount 
Committee a set of written procedures for between-election, pre-election, during 
election, and post-election chain of custody and security procedures for the security and 
integrity of voting equipment and electronic election databases and materials, and also 
for the security of paper ballots and paper voter registration and election records, 
redacting specific passwords and security keys, describing how the public can 
participate in verifying security procedures, and
(5) By at least noon on Election Day in any election covered by this audit legislation, 
provide a list of the number of precincts, along with the districts within each precincts, 
and a list of vote tabulation machines to be used in the election, the serial numbers for 
each vote-counting machine, along with the precinct(s) and the congressional district(s) 
that each machine will handle, and
(6) Not print any paper roll ballot records after Election Day which voters have not had an 
opportunity to verify in order to replace any damaged or missing voter-verifiable paper 
roll ballot records, and
(7) Produce and publicly post auditable unofficial vote count reports, and
(8) Provide facilities and materials for conducting the manual vote count audits. Whenever 
suitable facilities are available, the audits shall be administered at the location where 
the ballots cast in the election are stored and counted after the date of the election, and 
in the presence of those personnel who under statute are responsible for the custody of 
the ballots, and
(9) Publicly post notices required by this statute regarding vote count audits, and
(10)Have staff present during vote count audits and oversee ballot transport and security to 
and in the facility provided for the vote count audits, and
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(11)Provide a method for members of the public to observe the vote count audits and verify 
the integrity and accuracy of the audit, and
(12)Provide election records and voter verifiable paper ballot records to auditors, and
(13)Work with vote count auditors to resolve and explain any discrepancies discovered 
during a vote count audit, and
(14)Complete the verification and counting of the absentee and provisional ballots and 
produce a final, updated auditable vote count report which includes the absentee and 
provisional ballots within 21 days after Election Day.
(15)Not certify any election result until the completion of the vote count audits and the 
public posting of the audit reports.
Section 12: Absentee and Provisional Ballot Auditing
1. All absentee and provisional ballots shall be examined for legality and counted, and 
the auditable vote count report shall be updated to include all absentee and 
provisional ballots within 14 days of Election Day.
2. The mandatory vote count audit may be conducted in two stages. Stage one, the vote 
counts are audited without taking into account the provisional and absentee ballot 
vote counts.  Stage two, after the absentee and provisional ballots are evaluated for 
legality and counted, then the audit is adjusted to account for the new vote counts.
a. The initial auditable vote count report, prior to stage one of the audit shall 
clearly note whether or not it excludes the absentee or provisional ballots and 
shall include the number of total absentee and provisional ballots that were 
cast in each county, and
b. The updated auditable vote count reports which include the absentee and 
provisional ballots shall be publicly posted under the same requirements as 
for the initial auditable vote count reports, prior to the random selections for 
stage two of the audits.
c. In a two stage audit, the absentee and provisional ballots shall be counted, 
sorted, stored, and reported in the auditable vote count report in identifiable 
batches that are equal or smaller in size to an average-sized vote count (in 
number of ballots cast) in the county, or, if not, then all absentee and 
provisional ballots shall be manually audited.  
d. The Election Audit and Recount Committee shall determine the audit 
amounts and procedures for two-stage vote count audits subject to the 
requirements of this statute.
3. If absentee and provisional ballots are included in the initial auditable vote count 
report and audited in a one-stage audit with other ballots in the election, then they 
may be counted, sorted, stored, and reported according to the same identifiable 
auditable vote counts or precinct vote counts as the election day and early voting 
ballots.  If they are not, then the absentee and provisional ballots shall be counted, 
sorted, stored, and reported in the auditable vote count report in identifiable batches 
that are, as close as possible, equal in size to an average-sized vote count (in number 
of ballots cast) in the county.
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4. The absentee and provisional ballots shall, if voting equipment or procedures permit, 
also be reported by precinct in the auditable vote count report.
Funding for Mandatory Vote Count Audits 
This bill authorizes $260,000 ($260 Thousand) per general election cycle (in even years) to 
reimburse counties for the costs of conducting independent audits of vote count accuracy. 
Funds shall be distributed after the audits are completed in an amount of up to $100,000 to 
cover expenses of the State Election Audit & Recount Committee for one auditable election, 
and $2,000 to be reimbursed to each county for administrative fees plus the remaining amount 
to be distributed to each county to pay the vote count auditors and other expenses, in 
proportion to the total number of ballots which are manually counted in the audits in each 
county.  All these amounts may be increased each year according to inflation according to the 
method that the state uses to adjust for inflation.
[Note: Change the amounts for your state. A more detailed analysis of costs can be done using election results  
data from prior auditable elections for each county.]
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Formulas for Selecting Vote Counts to Audit
Error Bounds for Each Vote Count:
Within any one vote count, the maximum possible amount of error in the reported margin (in 
votes) which could deny the closest runnerup a rightful win is equal to the number of ballots 
cast plus the margin in votes between the lowest scoring winner and the highest scoring loser:
Where ( )1 2i ir r−  is the reported unofficial vote margin 
between the lowest scoring winner and the highest scoring loser (or losing alternative in the 
case of certain contests) and ib  is the number of ballots cast in the auditable vote count (or 
precinct) numbered i.  For example, the maximum possible margin error is 200% of all ballots 
if the runnerup has zero reported votes but voters had actually given the runnerup 100% of 
votes.  
If desired, a multiplier of between 0 and 1 could be multiplied times ie  to reflect the fact that if 
100% of all available ballots were incorrectly counted for the unofficial winner in any vote 
count, then such a vote count would be immediately suspicious to voters, so that a vote 
fraudster would be unlikely to switch 100% of available target ballots and any errors this large 
would be immediately suspicious.  This author recommends that any such multiplier should be 
greater than or equal to 0.50 and, if a multiplier of less than 1 is used, then a minimum of one 
vote count in each separately administered jurisdiction where an election contest occurs should 
be randomly selected for audit in addition to the number selected by the formula for the 
number of selection rounds below.  Example: Using a multiplier of 0.50 with a minimum 
requirement of 1 vote count audited per county for every county for each election contest, 
results in an overall 5.5% audit of precincts in Utah’s federal and state-level election contests 
in its 2004 general election.
The Total Possible Error in Each Election Contest:
i
i
E e= ∑       Sum the error bounds of all the reported unofficial vote counts.   
Selection Probability for Each Auditable Vote Count:
i
i
e
p
E
=      The weighted selection probability for each vote count is found by 
dividing each vote count’s upper bound for margin error by the total possible error in all vote 
counts.
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The Overall Margin in Each Election Contest
Where M=margin in votes, R1 = #votes for winner, and R2 = 
#votes for closest runner-up
Number of Selection Rounds:
The number of selection rounds t, is the natural log of alpha divided by 
the natural log of the quantity one minus the margin M divided by the sum of the error bounds 
for all auditable vote counts in the election contest. Alpha is 1 minus the confidence level.  I.e. 
alpha is the desired maximum probability that if there exists a subset T of auditable vote counts 
with enough error sufficient to alter an election outcome, at least one member of T will be in 
the audit.  Eg. If the confidence-level is 95%, then alpha is 0.05 or 5%.
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